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Abstract
In recent years interest has grown in central bank independence as research has shown
that it may affect many important financial issues such as unemployment, inflation, and inflation
variability, among others. However, empirical evidence regarding its effect has been inconclusive
and there is low correlation among various legal central bank independence measures. In this
thesis, I attempt to resolve these problems by generating a new measure of legal central bank
independence that takes into account divergence between laws and practices. I then measure the
impact that democracy and proportional electoral systems have on reducing this divergence and
find that democracy appears to have no impact on divergence, or actually increases it. While the
results are mixed for proportional electoral systems, it appears that there will be less divergence
between de jure and de facto central bank independence in countries using proportional electoral
systems than countries utilizing majoritarian electoral systems.
Using this information, I then test the impact that the new measure of legal central bank
independence has on two key economic variables: inflation and inflation variability. I find that
while it is a significant factor for explaining inflation in both developed and developing
countries, it has less value in explaining inflation variability. I conclude, therefore, that while this
new measure of legal independence provides a better indicator of a central bank’s ability to
pursue orthodox monetary policies over the long term, it is not foolproof. Consequently, in the
future, model adjustments need to be made to better analyze the impact that the new model of
legal central bank independence has on price stability. This will provide long-term stability
regarding a country’s economic policies for investors and individuals alike.
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Introduction
What impact does an independent central bank have on monetary policies? In recent
years interest in central bank independence has grown as research has shown that it may affect a
variety of important financial issues including inflation, inflation variability, unemployment, and
a country's budget deficit, among others (Eijffinger and de Haan 1996). However, while
independent central banks, which are associated with orthodox monetary policies, are lauded by
scholars and policymakers alike, measuring the level of independence is a controversial issue.
Some researchers measure it based on legal factors such as appointment of board members,
length of members’ terms in office, and whether government officials sit on the bank’s board
(Alesina 1988; Cukierman 1992; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991). Others, in contrast,
argue that these measures do not capture the true level of independence since oftentimes there are
broad divergences between legal obligations and actual practices, especially in developing
countries. Consequently, they measure central bank independence using observable factors
including a governor’s turnover rate (Cukierman 1992; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992; de
Haan and Siermann 1994) and a governor’s political vulnerability, which is defined as the
percentage of political transitions followed within six months by the replacement of the central
bank governor (Cukierman and Webb 1995).
The use of different measures of central bank independence has led to mixed evidence
regarding the impact of central bank independence. Bade and Parkin (1988) created an index of
legal central bank independence and examined 12 industrial countries between 1972 and 1986.
Their findings showed a negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation
but no relationship between central bank independence and inflation variability. Meanwhile,
Cargill (1995) utilized Cukierman’s (1992) weighted legal independence index for 20 industrial
1

countries between 1962 and 1991 and found no relationship between central bank independence
and inflation.
These contradictory findings should not be surprising. Forder (1999) discovered that
when Germany and Switzerland are removed from various measures of central bank
independence, the correlation coefficient between several highly respected measures of legal
central bank independence is extremely low. Likewise, other studies (Cukierman 1992;
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992) have shown that while legal independence reduces
inflation and inflation variability in developed countries, it does not impact these variables in
developing countries. Instead, a better indicator of monetary policies in these countries is the
central bank governor’s turnover rate.
The inconsistencies between various measures of legal central independence bank and
their seeming inability to explain monetary policy in developing countries indicate the need for a
better measure of central bank independence. In this thesis, I argue that de jure and de facto
measures of central bank independence, by themselves, are incomplete. Therefore, I propose that
a new measure of legal independence, which takes into account legal independence and how well
actual practices coincide with these laws, will provide a more thorough picture of the central
bank’s independence in both developed and developing countries, and its ability to pursue
orthodox monetary policies over the long term than either individual de jure or de facto measures
of independence.
I then examine domestic political variables that reduce the gap. More specifically, I argue
that an increase in the level of democracy in a state will increase the convergence between the
two measures of central bank independence due to rule of law and stable property rights.
However, even when countries have same level of democracy, there are often broad differences
2

among them. One feature in particular that distinguishes democracies is electoral systems.
Scholars generally place electoral systems into three broad categories: majoritarian, proportional,
and mixed. In a majoritarian electoral system the candidate or political party that wins the most
votes wins while, as its name suggests, a proportional electoral system is designed to produce
proportional outcomes between a party’s vote share and the number of seats it is allocated.
Finally, a mixed system combines both types of electoral formulas in their elections (Clark,
Golder, and Golder 2009; 473-515). Due to the increased need for credible information and the
greater number of partisan veto players in proportional electoral systems, I argue that countries
employing a proportional electoral system will see greater convergence between de jure and de
facto central bank independence than countries utilizing a majoritarian electoral system.
Proportional electoral systems are designed to increase continuity between the
percentage of votes a political party and/or coalition receives, and the number of seats it is
allocated in the legislature. Therefore, it reduces the surplus of votes, i.e. the number of votes
over and above what is needed to win a seat in the legislature, for the winning candidate(s) and
the number of votes spent on losing candidates. Together, surplus votes and votes for the losing
candidates are referred to as “wasted votes.”
In proportional electoral systems where fewer votes are “wasted”, there tend to be more
political parties each of which can be viewed as a partisan veto player. Additionally, research
(e.g. Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957) has shown that different constituencies and electoral cycles
cause political parties/coalitions to have divergent monetary policy preferences. However, due to
the high costs of obtaining information, monetary policy is designated to a cabinet minister.
Because the cabinet minister is given agenda control and discretion over monetary policy, there
is an incentive for this individual to manipulate policy for his/her own benefit, at the expensive
3

of other party/coalition members. According to Bernhard (2002), an independent central bank
can check this problem by providing credible information regarding the impact of the cabinet’s
monetary policies and by removing discretion in day to day monetary operations (Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Havrilesky 1994). He also finds that an increase in legal central
bank independence increases cabinet durability.
However, this same argument can be applied to the convergence of de jure and de facto
independence. Tsebelis (1995; 2002) argues that an increase in the number of veto players leads
to greater policy stability. Due to the greater number of political parties in proportional electoral
systems, a wider variety of interests are represented. Therefore, when a political party/coalition
takes power, there is an even greater need for individual legislatures/political parties to have the
credible information on monetary policy that an independent central bank provides due to the
increase in divergent preferences.
A potential critic of this hypothesis is that over time, general preferences regarding the
level of autonomy afforded to a central bank may change. Due, however, to the large number of
veto players in a proportional representation system, laws providing the central bank with legal
autonomy may remain static (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). To respond to preference changes, the
government may undermine or bolster de facto central bank autonomy, thus increasing the
divergence between de jure and de facto central bank independence. However, literature on
informal institutions (e.g. Lauth 2000; North 1990) indicates that they tend to be highly durable
and when they do experience change it tends to be slow and incremental. Moreover, since central
bank independence provides credible information on monetary policy that enables individual
legislatures/coalition party members to ensure that monetary policies are not unfairly
disadvantaging their electoral potential, regardless of whether a right-wing or left-wing
4

party/coalition is in power, they will value central bank independence. Therefore, it is unlikely
that in a proportional representation system, the government will make broad changes to de facto
central bank independence.
It is important to note that this thesis does not argue that a higher level of democracy and
the presence of a proportional electoral system will increase legal or non-legal central bank
independence. A higher level of democracy may cause politicians to reduce central bank
independence so they can implement inflationary monetary policies to benefit their electoral
interests. Likewise, because proportional electoral systems take into account a broader range of
interests, governments may experience greater pressure from the lower class to reduce central
bank independence so that it can conduct expansionary monetary policy that increases
employment beyond its natural level.1 This thesis, rather, is concerned with domestic political
variable that decrease the gap between de jure and de facto independence since this will increase
the credibility of the central bank at each level of independence.
Why is this important? Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue that when making choices,
political actors take into account both informal and formal incentives. For example, while
Mexico’s president is elected based on formal institutionalized rule, for many decades it was also
a common practice for the outgoing president to hand-pick his successor in a process known as
dedazo. As a result, it was impossible for an outsider to win the presidency (Langston 2003). If a
researcher ignored this important practice, any analysis of Mexican politics would be faulty.
Given, therefore, the importance of both types of incentives, institutional analysis should
examine both formal rules as well as informal practices.

1

This is defined as “the rate that would occur in the absence of monetary disturbances” (Bernhard, Broz, and Clark
2001, 706).
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For a central bank formal rules are seen in the level of de jure independence provided by
the government, while informal rules can be seen in the government's adherence to these rules.
However, as was previously noted, research (e.g. Cukierman 1992) indicates that although
formal rules governing a central bank are a strong indicator of monetary policy in developed
countries, they do not appear to have an impact in developing countries. Instead, the turnover
rate and/or the political vulnerability of the central bank governor is a better predictor of
monetary policies for these countries. If this is the case, then there is no need to grant the central
bank formal independence in developing countries since this is often a politically contentious
issue. Instead, countries can demonstrate their commitment to orthodox monetary policies simply
by providing the central bank with broad operational autonomy (Hiroi 2009). Likewise, scholars
and investors can predict monetary policies in developed countries by examining the laws
governing a central bank's independence.
However, the contention of this thesis is that a new measure of central bank independence
that takes into account legal independence and its divergence from actual practices governing the
central bank will provide a better indicator of a central bank’s ability to pursue orthodox
monetary policies regardless of whether it is a developed or developing country. To test this
hypothesis I will compare the impact that de jure, de facto, and the new model of legal central
bank independence have on two key economic variables: inflation and inflation variability.
These variables were chosen since central bank independence is “not the independence to
do anything that the CB pleases. It is rather the ability of the bank to stick to the price stability
objective even at the cost of other short-term real objectives” (Cukierman 1992, 370). This is
important because it will provide investors (both domestic and international) as well as
individual citizens with greater confidence in a country's long term monetary policies. Wage
6

contracts and investments can then be made based on a better analysis of the impact they will
have on the real value of individuals’ money.
The thesis will be organized into seven chapters. The first chapter will examine the
importance of central bank independence and the inadequacy of de jure and de facto measures of
central bank independence isolated from one another. The second chapter will then examine
factors that may influence the convergence of de jure and de facto central bank independence.
The third chapter posits that the new measure of legal central bank independence will better
account for inflation and inflation variability than each of de jure and de facto measures alone. In
the fourth chapter I review of the hypotheses advocated in this thesis. The fifth chapter will then
provide the research design and descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses. The sixth
chapter will examine the empirical evidence and its implications. Finally, the last chapter will
provide a review of the thesis and concluding remarks.
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Chapter 1
Importance and Measurement of Central Bank Independence
The central premise for creating an independent central bank is that it provides the
country with a stable economic environment. Cukierman (1995) identifies five reasons why in
recent years, countries have chosen to show their commitment to price stability by increasing
central bank independence rather than by using other instruments. First, there was the breakdown
of institutions, such as the Bretton Woods System, that were designed to maintain monetary
stability. Second, the example of the Bundesbank, the German central bank, showed that an
independent central bank could be instrumental in maintaining nominal stability. Third, for many
countries in Europe, increased central bank independence was a precondition for entrance into
the European Monetary Union. Fourth, stabilization of high inflation caused policymakers to
search for institutions that could prevent this problem from reoccurring in the future. Finally,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many former socialist countries saw an independent
central bank as a necessary institutional device to enable the market economy to function in an
orderly manner.
So how does an independent central bank help maintain price stability? Oatley (1999)
argues that independent central banks prevent politicians from using monetary policy for
political gain. Although macroeconomic stability is desirable, opportunistic politicians will
pursue inflationary policies to improve their chances of being reelected (Nordhaus 1975; Boylan
1998). More specifically, Cukierman (1992) provides three potential motives for monetary
expansion: the employment motive, the revenue motive, and the balance of payments motive.
The employment motive occurs when policymakers try to increase employment above its
natural level, which they view as too low. There are two theories regarding this bias. The first,
8

which was developed by Barro and Gordon (1983), argues that politicians try to increase
employment because taxes on labor have driven employment below socially optimal levels.
Woolley (1984), on the other hand, advocates the belief that politicians try to use monetary
policy to increase employment levels since an important part of their constituency are negatively
impacted by higher unemployment.
Meanwhile, the revenue motive occurs when governments increase the money supply to
raise revenues. This motive will be most prevalent in countries that have smaller capital markets
where it is more difficult for the government to issue large amounts of debt to finance its budget.
Finally, the balance of payment motive occurs when politicians inflate and devalue the currency
to achieve better balance of payments. Cukierman indicates that currency devaluation benefits
balance of payments issues in two ways. First, by reducing real wages it can stimulate
employment and output, thus increasing resources available for exports and import substitutes.
Second, devaluation of the currency reduces the real value of government obligations held by the
public. Due to the lower buying power of their monetary resources, the public will, therefore,
reduce its consumption.
However, these motives are plagued by dynamic inconsistency problems. Kydland and
Prescott (1977) argue that when the government retains discretionary power over monetary
policies, rational choices in the present period lead to suboptimal outcomes in future periods.
More specifically, when the public knows that the government has the discretion to achieve one
of these motives, it will embed beliefs regarding future inflation into the nominal wage and
capital contracts thus reducing the effectiveness of the government's monetary “shock” policies
(Cukierman 1995). Governments can avoid this problem by implementing orthodox monetary
policies.
9

However, as long as they retain discretion over monetary policies, they are faced by the
credible commitment problem; they may have future incentive to renege on their promise and
they hold the power to enforce the promise (North and Weingast 1989). Governments can
increase their credibility by creating rules (Kydland and Prescott 1977) and institutions
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 134) that limit the government’s ability to influence policy. For
monetary policy, this institution is an independent central bank that has an explicit mandate for
price stability. However, money is politics. Consequently, conferring legal independence to the
central bank is often a contentious issue.
Granting central banks with legal independence removes an important element of
economic decision-making from the control of democratic governments and forces them to
implement fiscally conservative policies that ensure macroeconomic stability (Boylan 1998).
Politicians may object to this independence since it inhibits their ability to gain electoral support
through economic policies that benefit their constituents. This is a problem that has long been
cited in the literature on political-business cycles. Research (e.g. Nordhaus 1975) indicates that
employment-inflation patterns in democratic countries are often based on election cycles. To gain
electoral support, when there is an impending election, the government will implement
inflationary policies that increase employment levels. Following the elections, however,
increased pressure to reduce inflation forces a tightening of monetary policies that leads to higher
unemployment and deflation. As this pattern becomes cyclical, it leads to boom and bust cycles
that are suboptimal for the economy.
However, even when a government provides the central bank with legal autonomy, it does
not necessarily guarantee that the central bank will be independent. If the rules governing its
independence are not followed, the bank's ability to pursue orthodox monetary policies may
10

actually be much lower than what is legally stipulated. In Argentina, for example, the law
provides the central bank governor with a four-year term. It is, however, a common practice for
the governor to resign whenever a new government takes power or even when a new finance
minister comes into office. As a result, the average term for Argentinean central bank governors
in the 1980s was a mere 10 months (Cukierman 1992). If a legally independent central bank
remains subservient to the government, then its credibility as an institution that checks the use of
opportunistic policies by the government is greatly diminished and it will be less successful in
obtaining price stability. Hence, during the 1980s, Argentina’s average annual compound
inflation was 319 percent and annual increases in the consumer price index ranged from a
minimum of approximately 90 percent in 1986 to a maximum of 3080 percent in 1989.2
Another problem facing governments is that there may be broad opposition to providing
the central bank with legal autonomy. This often occurs when there are broad political cleavages
regarding the benefits of an independent central bank. Research (e.g. Taylor 1992; Mershon
1994) indicates that when it is difficult to create formal institutions, political actors may resort to
informal institutions. The government, therefore, may grant the central bank broad informal
autonomy (i.e. refrain from interfering in the central bank's operations) to implement orthodox
monetary policies, yet withhold legal autonomy (Hiroi 2009). Although this independence
increases the central bank’s credibility, the lack of institutionalization leaves it vulnerable to
political pressure and perceptions of forthcoming economic and/or political instability can trigger
fears that negatively affect the country’s finances (Hiroi and Block 2010).

2 This information was calculated using data from the World Bank’s (2005) “World Development Indicators
2005”.
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In Brazil, for example, President Cardoso (1995-2002) sought to provide the central bank
with legal autonomy. However, opposition from leftist political parties prevented him from doing
so. As a result, he was only able to provide the bank with informal operational autonomy.
Following the 1997 financial crisis in Asia and the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, investors
began to fear that Brazil’s economy would be the next one to collapse. This caused capital flight
that led to a 45 percent decline in the country’s foreign reserves in less than five months and
forced Brazil to negotiate an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund.
This, however, was not the end of Brazil's financial problems. In 2002, as President
Cardoso's term in office was coming to an end, it appeared that the leftist candidate, Luiz Inácio
“Lula” da Silva, would become Brazil's next president. Because the central bank's autonomy was
not cemented into law, many investors feared that Lula, a former labor union leader, would
reduce the central bank's operational autonomy so that he could pursue policies that would
benefit his constituents. This led to widespread capital flight, currency devaluation, and high
inflation that only ended when Lula took office and demonstrated a strong commitment to
orthodox monetary policies.
As this indicates, both de jure and de facto central bank independence are incomplete
and neither one, by itself, will enable a country to solve its credible commitment problem. If
laws are in place but not followed, a common practice in developing countries, then investors
will have minimal confidence in the central bank’s ability to implement fiscally conservative
monetary policies. Likewise, informal independence will also leave investors (both domestic and
international) wary since there is no guarantee that the central bank will retain its independence
over the long term and high inflation may erode the value of their investments. Given these
problems, a better overall measure of central bank independence is one that takes into account
12

legal central bank independence and the gap in actual practices. This new way of measuring
central bank independence will provide a more thorough indicator of the central bank’s ability to
pursue orthodox monetary policies over the long term. It will also provide investors with greater
confidence in the stability of a country’s current economic policies, thus helping prevent
problems such as the capital flight that Brazil experienced in the 1990s.
It is important to note that this thesis does not argue that a country that has minimal legal
independence but a high level of continuity with actual practices will pursue orthodox monetary
policies. Rather, it posits that analyzing legal measures of central bank independence together
with the gap in actual practices will reduce uncertainty regarding a country's long term monetary
policies. This is important because it will enable wage contracts and investments to be made
based on the most accurate information available. Additionally, this new way of analyzing legal
central bank independence will also enable scholars to better gauge the impact that each level of
legal central bank independence has on monetary policies.

13

Chapter 2
The Convergence of Measures
Given the importance of measuring central bank independence based on legal obligations
and the divergence from actual practices, what factors increase continuity between laws and
practices? To date this question has not been examined. Because most quantitative studies of
central bank independence have focused on either de jure or de facto independence, scholars
have centered their efforts on identifying factors that influence de jure or de facto independence
in isolation from each other. Maxfield (1997) argues that central bank independence in
developing countries is dependent upon the whims of politicians who provide the central bank
with greater independence when they want to increase international creditworthiness.
Meanwhile, other scholars examine sectoral aspects including political party polarization
(Alesina 1988; Bernhard 1997; 2002), the strength of the financial sector (Clark 1993), and the
number of and polarization of veto players (Keefer and Stasavage 2003).
Although these studies have made important advances in understanding why countries
choose to provide the central bank with more independence, this thesis is focused on the gap
between formal and informal rules. In other words, what factors increase the willingness of
institutional actors to abide by laws governing a central bank's independence? It is plausible to
imagine that some elements that increase either de jure or de facto independence will also impact
the convergence of the two types of independence. For example, if legal independence increases
when countries want to demonstrate international credit worthiness (Maxfield 1997), then
countries may also strictly follow these rules to bolster their reputation. Likewise, if the financial
sector is a powerful actor, it may demand strict adherence to laws governing central bank
independence to prevent expansionary monetary policies from eroding the value of its interests.
14

Another variable, whose impact on central bank independence has not been broadly
analyzed by scholars, is democracy. One study (Bagheri and Habibi 1998) has shown that a
higher level of political rights leads to more central bank independence in democratic and semidemocratic countries. Additionally, Hiroi and Block (2010) speculate that an increase in
democracy will reduce the gap between the two measures in developing countries, but they do
not test this idea or go into great detail regarding the logic behind this argument.
A central reason for this gap may be that literature on central bank independence places
great emphasis on industrial countries (e.g. Bernhard 1998) where scholars may simply assume
that a high level of democracy exists. Eijffinger and de Haan’s (1996, Table B1) overview of
studies on central bank independence show that 24 key studies examined central bank
independence in industrial countries while only 5 looked at its impact in developing countries.
This is an important gap in central bank literature that I hope to help fill. In particular, I argue
that that an increase in the level of democracy will reduce the gap between a country's de jure
and de facto central bank independence score in both developed and developing countries.
Scholars (North and Thomas 1973; North 1990) argue that democracies are characterized
by rule of law and stable property rights. These aspects of democracy are likely to reduce the gap
between a country’s de jure and de facto central bank independence for two reasons. First, since
countries with higher levels of democracy more closely follow the rule of law, when central
banks are given legal independence, it is more likely that the government will abide by rules
governing the bank's independence, thus increasing its credibility.
This contention is not without its critics. Barro (2000) agrees with the argument that rule
of law is associated with stable property rights that lead to increases in economic growth. He
found, however, that democracy is not necessarily associated with rule of law; many
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nondemocratic countries closely follow the rule of law although these rules may be unfair. A
country's level of democracy, therefore, may have no bearing on central bank independence, and
in some cases, may actually have a negative impact on it. For example, as the level of democracy
increases, the electorate may make greater demands for redistribution programs that require the
government to reduce the central bank's independence to obtain more economic resources.
Second, property rights traditionally have been thought of as physical assets such as land
and commodities. However, with the advent of fiat money and vast increases in foreign direct
investment, monetary property rights, i.e. the purchasing power of a country's currency, have
grown increasingly important. As was indicated in the beginning of this thesis, when
governments retain control over monetary policy, it is difficult for them to assure stable monetary
property rights due to the credible commitment problem.
One way to ensure stable monetary property rights is to provide the central bank with
independence and a mandate for price stability. Broz (2002) argues that the greater transparency
present in democratic regimes increases the credibility of legal central bank independence since
opportunistic policies will have greater costs for political actors. Although this institutional
remedy may work in a democracy where there are a broad variety of interest groups, it will have
minimal impact in a dictatorship. Bagheri and Habibi (1998) argue that since there are no
constitutional guarantees in a dictatorship, central bank independence is meaningless since the
government holds all the power and can do as it pleases.
Critics, however, may argue that this lack of governmental restraint is beneficial for
achieving the central bank's main goal-price stability. Research (Skidmore 1977) indicates that
democratic countries have higher inflation than non-democratic countries and that authoritarian
regimes’ ability to minimize societal pressures may help them better achieve price stability
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(O’Donnell 1973). An example of this is Chile. In 1973 a military junta, responding to vast
economic instability, ousted the democratically-elected government led by president Salvador
Allende. Slashing all government programs deemed unnecessary and following orthodox
monetary policies, between 1973 and 1979, the dictatorship was able to reduce annual inflation
from 361.5 percent to 33.4 percent (World Bank 2005).
There is, however, a flip side to this coin. While the government may be able to credibly
commit to orthodox monetary policies that help maintain stable monetary property rights in the
short term, there is no guarantee that these policies will be maintained over the long term. Since
there are fewer checks and balances in authoritarian regimes, the government can rapidly
implement drastic changes in monetary policy to suit its needs. Therefore, for every case like
Chile, where a decrease in the level of democracy led to low and stable inflation, there is a case
like Zimbabwe where the erosion of political rights and civil liberties coincided with
hyperinflation that reached an astounding 11.2 million percent in August 2008 (Cable News
Network 2008).
In contrast, in democratic regimes a wider range of interests must be represented since
politicians can be voted out of office by the citizens. Research (e.g. Kramer 1971; Erikson 1989)
shows that economic performance is a key issue influencing candidate support in both highincome (Chappell and Veiga 2000) and low-income democracies (Remmer 1991; Pacek 1994;
Pacek and Radcliff 1995).3 More specifically, positive economic performance increases
candidate/political party support, while negative economic performance reduces it. Therefore, the
government, which is made up of elected officials, may avoid vast changes to de jure and de

3

A broad overview of the literature on the relationship between economic performance and electoral support can be
found in Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier’s (2000) article.
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facto central bank independence that erode monetary property rights since these actions may
negatively affect the economy and result in their political demise.
In addition to holding government leaders accountable for monetary policy, democracy
may also reduce the gap between legal central bank independence and actual practices by
allowing changes to laws governing central bank independence to be challenged at different
levels (i.e. judiciary, legislature, etc) of the government. In other words, there are a greater
number of veto players Tsebelis (1995; 2002) argues that the greater number of veto players, the
more static policy will remain. Likewise, Moser (1999) shows that the more checks-and-balances
(veto players) that are prevalent in a country, the greater impact that a given level of central bank
independence has on monetary policy. The increased difficulty of making policy changes will
help increase the convergence between central bank laws and actual practices. In contrast, in
dictatorships, there are fewer checks and balances, and thus there will be greater divergence
between laws and practices over the long term.
Indicating the relationship between democracy and the convergence of legal and nonlegal central bank independence is important. However, this is simply scratching the surface
since there are broad variations among democracies. For example, while the United Kingdom
and the United States both have highly democratic governments, a comparative analysis of their
political systems would show vast differences in their institutions and the outcomes that they
produce.
Underlying the difference between democratic countries is the vision of how democracy
should be conducted. Clark, Golder, and Golder (2009, 379-384) note that as indicated by
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Arrow's Theorem4 countries can only have two of three desirable attributes: group transitivity,
universal admissibility, and non-dictatorship. Consequently, they must choose between
institutions that disperse or concentrate power. When democracies disperse power, Lijphart
(1999) refers to them as consensus democracies, while democracies that concentrate power are
referred to as majoritarian democracies.
In majoritarian democracies, policies are based on the opinions of the electoral majority,
and minority opinions should not impact the policymaking process. In contrast, consensus
democracies believe that policies should be determined by the largest number of citizens possible
(Clark, Golder, and Golder 2009, 680). These differing viewpoints are vitally important since
they determine a country's political institutions.
In particular, it is recognized that majoritarian democracies have majoritarian electoral
systems where the candidate or party that receives the most votes wins. Meanwhile, consensus
democracies tend to employ proportional electoral systems that try to ensure continuity between
the percentage of votes won and the number of seats won. In other words, they produce
proportional outcomes. To more clearly understand the impact of electoral systems, consider the
case of the United Kingdom (Clark, Golder, and Golder 2009, 475-476).
This country employs a single-member district plurality system that is a type of
majoritarian electoral system where each voter cast a vote for a candidate in a single-member
district and the candidate in each district with the most votes wins. During the 1983 legislative
election, the Alliance, a coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party,
won 25.4 percent of the national vote but earned a mere 3.5 percent of legislative seats since

4 Arrow's theorem and the logic underlying it can be found in his book Social Choice and Individual Values
(1963).
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their votes were spread across many districts. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party won 61.1
percent of legislative seats with only 42.4 percent of the national vote. If, however, the same
election results had occurred in a proportional electoral system, the election results would have
more closely mirrored actual vote percentages. Thus, the Alliance would have won
approximately 25 percent of legislative seats, while the Conservative Party would have won 42
percent of legislative seats.
The question that remains is: how does the type of electoral system impacts the gap
between laws and actual practices governing central bank independence? In theory, when a
legislative body passes a law, it should retain the force of law regardless of which political party
is in power. However, especially with regards to monetary policy, vast differences exist among
the electorate. According to the partisan model of macroeconomic theory (Alesina and Sachs
1988; Hibbs 1977), governments pursue macroeconomic policies that benefit their core
constituents’ interests. More specifically, when left wing parties are in power, they pursue low
unemployment since their supporters tend to come from wage workers who are more negatively
affected by high unemployment. In contrast, right wing parties, whose supporters are more
affluent, pursue low inflation at the cost of increased unemployment. Cameron (1978) tested this
theory using a sample of 18 industrial countries and found that when left wing parties were in
power, there were higher government expenditures than when right wing parties were in power.
This indicates that depending on the ideology of the political party in power, there will be
different pressures placed on the central bank.
Given these findings, we would assume that right wing governments would want to
provide the central bank with more autonomy to pursue low inflation policies while left wing
governments would be more interested in maintaining control over the bank. An example of this
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is Chile. Two months prior to its first democratic elections in more than a decade, the right-wing
authoritarian regime, ruled by General Pinochet, passed a constitutional act providing the central
bank with extensive legal autonomy. A leading member of the military junta that controlled the
country, Admiral Jose Toribio Merino, said that this action was taken to prevent the left-leaning
opposition from introducing “a socialist economy” (Latin American Markets 1989). However,
opposition members decried this action as a way for the dictatorship to tie the hands of the
incoming democratic government in regards to monetary policy.
The electoral system, however, will influence how much independence a central bank is
afforded. Under a majoritarian system a right wing government may decide to provide the central
bank with broad legal independence to maintain low inflation, while a left wing party may grant
it less independence so that it can pursue higher employment levels. However, oftentimes laws
passed under a majoritarian electoral system represent the interests of a simple plurality of
voters. Therefore, there may be widespread opposition to the level of independence given to the
central bank. If a right wing government provides the central bank with broad autonomy, then
when a left wing government comes into power, it may undermine laws governing central bank
independence through policies such as replacing the central bank governor. On the other hand, if
a left wing government provides the central bank with minimal independence, when a right wing
government comes into power, it may give the central bank broader informal autonomy than
what is stated in the laws. This will result in greater divergence between de jure and de facto
independence.
A key question, however, remains. If in a majoritarian electoral system a political party
has a plurality in the legislative branch, why would it not change the laws governing a central
bank’s independence to a level that more closely matches its electoral interests? Similar to other
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scholars, Boylan (1998) argues that an independent central bank is an important signaling device
to international creditors and investors that the central bank will pursue orthodox monetary
policy. Therefore, even if a political party is in disagreement with the level of autonomy afforded
to the central bank, it will avoid reducing formal independence to prevent massive outflows of
foreign capital that will negatively affect the economy and reduce their future electoral potential.
Instead, it may choose to reduce de facto independence since this reduction is often more
difficult to detect.
On the other hand, a political party that is committed to greater orthodox monetary
policies may want to increase legal independence. However, a simple legislative majority does
not guarantee that it has sufficient power to change the law. For example, in the United States the
Republican Party may want to increase legal central bank independence. If, however, it has a
simple majority in either the House or the Senate, the Democratic Party could block increased
central bank independence through the use of filibusters and other institutional devices.
Likewise, since changes in central bank independence have monetary distributional effects, they
are often controversial. Therefore, the Republican Party may instead chose to provide the central
bank with greater de facto autonomy which increases its ability to pursue orthodox monetary
policies while also reducing controversy since it is less visible to the general public.
As noted earlier in this section, proportional electoral systems tend to “waste” fewer votes
than majoritarian electoral systems by reducing the disparity between percentage of votes
received and the distribution of legislative seats. In general, this leads to more political parties
and the number of seats allocated to political parties more strongly mirrors voter preference.
Logic would seem to indicate that countries using proportional electoral system would see
increased divergence between de jure and de facto central bank independence since there are a
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greater number of competing interests trying to manipulate monetary policy for their own
benefit. However, due to the greater need for independent information on monetary policies and
the increased number of partisan veto players in countries utilizing proportional electoral
systems, I argue that in democracies, proportional electoral systems will lead to a larger
reduction in the gap between de jure and de facto central bank independence than majoritarian
electoral systems.
Bernhard (2002) indicates that research (e.g. Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957) has shown that
within political parties and among coalition partners, there are divergent monetary policy
preferences due to a variety of factors including different constituencies and varying electoral
cycles, among others. Additionally, when a political party/coalition obtains power in a
parliamentary democracy, it gives monetary policy responsibility to a cabinet minister since it is
costly for individual legislators to develop expertise in this policy area. To provide the cabinet
member incentive to develop expertise in monetary policy and its impact, he/she is given agenda
control and discretion over monetary policy. These powers, along with asymmetric information
regarding the impact of particular monetary policies, may tempt the cabinet minister to
manipulate monetary policy for his/her electoral benefit to the detriment of other party/coalition
members.
The creation of an independent central bank, however, can check this tendency.
According to Bernhard (2002), an independent central bank reduces the cabinet’s discretion in
daily policy management (e.g. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991; Havrilesky 1994) and can
also publicize disputes with cabinet members (Havrilesky 1994). This enables it to provide
legislatures with credible information on the impact of the cabinet’s monetary policies thus
reducing the cabinet’s tendency to manipulate monetary policy and interparty conflict. This is
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important in parliamentary democracies since it increases cabinet durability, thus enabling the
political party/coalition to retain power for a longer time period.
Although Bernard uses this argument to explain increases in legal central bank
independence in the 1980s and 1990s, this same logic can be used to explain why there will be a
smaller gap between de jure and de facto central bank independence in countries using
proportional electoral systems than countries using majoritarian electoral systems. However, this
requires delving into more nuanced aspects. More specifically, my argument rests on the number
of veto players that are present in each type of electoral system.
Duverger’s Hypothesis states that proportional electoral systems are more likely to have
multiparty systems while Duverger’s Law indicates that plurality systems lean more toward two
party systems (Duverger 1954). According to Tsebelis (1995; 2002), each political party is a
partisan veto player and the greater the number of veto players, whether they are institutional or
partisan, the more difficult it is to change the status quo. Moser (1999) and Keefer and Stasavage
(2002) have also shown that an increase in the number of veto players affords the central bank
with greater independence to determine monetary policy.
Given the larger number of partisan veto players in a proportional electoral system, any
attempt to change either de jure or de facto independence (i.e. altering the status quo) will run
greater risk of opposition. Likewise, the increased number of political parties in proportional
electoral systems will make the central bank’s ability to provide credible information on the
monetary policy even more important since there is a greater fractionalization of interests.
Therefore, regardless of whether a right wing or a left wing political party/coalition controls the
government, they will avoid tampering with the central bank’s independence. As a result,
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countries that utilize proportional electoral systems will have a smaller gap between de jure and
de facto central bank independence than countries that have majoritarian electoral systems.
A criticism of this argument is that proportional electoral systems lead to greater
redistribution of economic resources than majoritarian electoral systems. There are a number of
possible explanations for this finding, including greater propensity of left wing parties to control
the government (Clark, Golder, and Golder 2009), fewer wasted votes by left wing parties whose
constituents tend to be concentrated in urban areas (Rodden 2005), and coalition governments
(Persoon, Roland, and Tabellini 2007), among others. We should expect, therefore, to find lower
levels of central bank independence in countries utilizing this type of electoral system.
However, while there may be lower levels of central bank independence, there should still be
more continuity between laws and practices. The logic surrounding this hypothesis, therefore,
remains the same.
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Chapter 3
The Impact on Key Economic Variables
A central contention of this thesis is that an increase in the level of democracy and the
presence of a proportional electoral system will increase the convergence of de jure and de facto
central bank independence. If these hypotheses are correct, what is their practical importance? As
was noted earlier, the justification for providing the central bank with independence is that it will
assure long-term monetary stability by helping countries overcome their credible commitment
problems. In particular, two economic indicators that central bank scholars often use are inflation
and inflation variability. These variables are examined since the justification for central bank
independence rests on its ability to help maintain price stability even when it may negatively
impact other economic variables (Cukierman 1992, 370).
There is an overall large body of evidence indicating that higher levels of central bank
independence lead to lower inflation (e.g. Cukierman 1992; Havrilesky and Granato 1993;
Alesina and Summers 1993).5 This is important because inflation erodes the purchasing power of
fiat money. Consequently, when the public believes that there will be high inflation in future
periods, they will include this factor in their calculations regarding future economic decisions.
For example, banks will charge higher interest rates on loans and workers will demand greater
wages even if the government promises to follow orthodox monetary policies in future periods.
Central bank literature (e.g.; Alesina and Summers 1993; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti
1992; de Haan and Sturm 1992) has also shown that central bank independence leads to lower

5 Note: An excellent summary of studies indicating the relationship between central bank independence and
inflation and inflation variability can be found in Tables B1 and B2 in The Political Economy of Central-Bank
Independence (Eijffinger and de Hann 1996).
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inflation variability. This is also important for a country' economic environment. Consider the
case of Bolivia. In 1981 there was a modest 32 percent increase in the consumer price index.
However, in 1985 this jumped to 11,750 percent (World Bank Development Indicators 2005).
When a country suffers from broad inflation variability, investors may be hesitant to invest in it
since they are uncertain that their investment will retain its value over the long term. If, however,
they still decide to invest in it, they will use the high risk level to justify charging exorbitant
interest rates, thus hindering individuals from borrowing money to expand their businesses.
Additionally, governments may be unable to meet the obligations on the loans they have taken
out. This can lead to debt crises such as the ones that occurred in Mexico in 1994 and Argentina
in 2001.
Past studies on the impact that central bank independence has on inflation and inflation
variability have used de jure and de facto measure of independence separately. Additionally,
Cukierman (1992) found that legal independence is relevant for explaining price stability only in
developed countries. In contrast, in developing countries, legal independence does not matter.
Instead, the turnover rate of central bank governors provided a better indicator of inflation and
inflation variability. A central contention of this thesis, however, is that de jure and de facto
central bank independence are important for ensuring price stability in both developed and
developing countries. Therefore, I hypothesize that the new measure of central bank
independence, which takes into account legal independence and the difference between it and
actual practices, will yield more predictive power explaining inflation and inflation variability
than indices using individual de jure or de facto measures.
This hypothesis is important because if it is correct, it will provide researchers with a new
manner of measuring central bank independence using data that are already available. Moreover,
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it will also show whether formal institutions (i.e. legally mandated central banks) matter in
developing countries. If they do not, politicians can refrain from expending political capital to
provide the central bank with legal independence. Instead they can show their commitment to
price stability simply by following orthodox monetary policies. If, however, formal institutions
are important, then politicians should try to increase the statutory independence of the central
bank to help ensure the long term monetary health of the country.
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Chapter 4
Hypotheses
Returning to the central ideas of this thesis, I posit the four following hypotheses.
H1: A higher level of democracy in a state will reduce the gap between de jure and de facto
central bank independence.
H2: In democracies, countries that utilize proportional electoral systems will have a smaller gap
between de jure and de facto central bank independence than countries that utilize
majoritarian electoral systems.
H3: At each level of independence, the new measure of legal central bank independence, which
takes into account legal independence and the gap between it and de facto independence, will
lead to a better prediction of inflation than indices using individual de jure or de facto
measures of central bank independence.
H4: At each level of independence, the new measure of legal independence, which takes into
account legal central bank independence and the gap between it and de facto central bank
independence, will lead to a better prediction of inflation variability than individual de
jure or de facto measurements of central bank independence.
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Chapter 5
Research Design
To test these four hypotheses, I use individual countries as my unit of analysis with a
cross-sectional research design based on data from four decades: the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s
and the 1990s. Since changes in central bank independence occur slowly, data measuring de jure
and de facto central bank independence are based on decade averages. A notable disadvantage of
measuring the variables in this manner is that it masks more nuanced changes in central bank
independence. However, this is the most state of the art measure available at this time. In spite of
this data limitation, there are still two factors that make these decades particularly interesting to
analyze.
First, the 1971 devaluation of the U.S. Dollar relative to gold helped cause the collapse of
the fixed exchange rate and increased the need for independent central banks to help maintain the
stability of the international financial system (Maxfield 1997). By examining central bank
independence during the 1960s, when a fixed exchange rate regime was in effect, and after the
1960s when it was not present, it is possible to see whether an independent central bank was an
important institution under both monetary regime types. Second, since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, more countries have implemented democratic practices. It is possible, therefore, to use a
wider sample that includes more developing countries in Eastern Europe where an independent
central bank may be an extremely important institutional device enabling a country to
demonstrate its commitment to orthodox monetary policies.
In this study there are three dependent variables. The first variable, Inflation, indicates a
country's annual inflation rate and is based on data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators 2005 dataset. Although inflation can be measured in different ways, I define it as the
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annual percentage increase in the consumer price index. To calculate the inflation rate, I used the
compound annual percentage increase in the consumer price index rather than the simple annual
percentage increase in for each decade. 6 This was done since the compound measure provides a
more accurate indicator of increases in prices. A central concern, however, may be that missing
data will skew this variable especially since many developing countries, which have high levels
of inflation, may not provide data. To address this problem, if at least 5 years of data are
available, I added the data and divide them by the number of years for which it is available.
Otherwise, the variable was coded as missing.
Table 1: Annual Inflation Rate
1960s
Mean
std.dev
Min
Max
N

1970s

1980s

1990s

8.62
21.34
1.00
149.00

16.05
21.20
4.00
130.00

28.13
59.43
2.00
365.00

27.64
69.63
1.00
634.00

52

61

105

137

In total there were 433 observations during the four decades. However, as indicated in
Table 1, inflation data were only available for 355 observations indicating that approximately 18
percent of data are missing. As would be expected, given the increased sample size during the
1980s and the 1990s and the inclusion of more developing countries, there is a higher number of
missing cases in these decades in comparison to the 1960s and the 1970s. However, in terms of
the percentage of missing cases, the decades of the 1960s and 1980s have the two highest
concentrations with 24 and 25 percent respectively. Also indicated in Table 1, within each decade
6 Note: Data on legal central bank independence during the 1990s ended in the year 2003. Therefore, for all
financial data in this thesis, the decade of the 1990s consists of data from 1990 to 2003.
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inflation varies widely, from a minimum of 1 percent during the 1960s and 1990s, to a maximum
of 634 percent in the 1990s. Given the vast differentials between the minimum and maximum
inflation rates, I use the log of inflation to prevent extreme values from skewing my findings.
The second dependent variable, Inflation Variability, indicates the variability of the
inflation rate and is also based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 dataset.
This variable is defined as the average number of standard deviations that each year’s inflation
rate in a decade is from the mean decade inflation rate. Table 2 indicates that the mean inflation
variability rate was approximately .75 across the four decades. Meanwhile, values ranged from a
minimum of 0.3 standard deviations in the 1990s, to a maximum of 1.01 standard deviations in
the 1980s.
Table 2: Annual Inflation Variability
1960s
Mean
Min
Max
N

1970s

1980s

1990s

.787
.490
.900

.775
.640
.900

.748
.380
1.01

.722
.300
.900

52

61

105

138

The third dependent variable measures the divergence between legal central
independence and actual practices. Since this variable is based on de jure and de facto
independence, it is first necessary to indicate how these variables are measured. As noted in the
introduction, researchers (Eijffinger and de Haan 1996; Forder 1999) have found that the
correlation coefficient between highly respected measures of legal central bank independence is
extremely low. Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) attribute this problem to two factors. First, there
are different interpretations of relevant bank laws that oftentimes depend on how familiar a
researcher is with a particular country. For example, they argue that the Dutch Central Bank, the
32

Nederlandsche Bank, is more independent than Cukierman (1992) codes them. Second, legal
measures focus on different aspects of independence. In particular, if a measure uses a large
number of variables and gives them equal weight, it may dilute the most important aspects of
central bank independence (Eijffinger and Schaling 1993). Given these problem, I use two
measures of legal independence to increase the internal validity of my findings.
The first measure of legal central bank independence, Cukierman Legal, is based Alex
Cukierman’s (1992) data on 69 countries in both the developed and developing world between
1950 and 1989.7 This measure of independence is based on 16 variables placed in four
categories: CEO, policy formations, central bank objectives, and limitations on lending. Using
the unweighted measure of central bank independence, each variable is given equal weight and is
assigned a value from 0 to 1. The aggregate value of these variables is then divided by 16 to
generate each country’s average level of legal central bank independence for each decade; the
higher the score, the more independent the central bank.
As indicated in Table 3, there was minimal change in legal independence between the
1960s and 1980s. In the 1960s the standard deviation was .01 points higher than it was during the
1970s and 1980s. Additionally, during the 1980s, the minimum level of independence increased
.01 points over previous decades. However, the average level of independence remained constant
across the three decades even though the sample size increased. This seems to indicate that
formal institutions are stable structures. Therefore, if comprehensive central bank independence
does reduce uncertainty regarding monetary policies, it should be a long term impact.

7

Note: I did not include central bank data from the 1950s in my analyses due to the dearth of other financial data for
these decades.
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Table 3: Cukierman Measure of Legal Central Bank Independence
1960s
1970s

1980s

mean
std.dev
min
max

.35
.13
.09
.69

.35
.12
.09
.69

.35
.12
.10
.69

N

58

67

69

The second measure of legal independence, GMT Legal, is based on the measurement
developed by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991). These scholars divide central bank
independence into two categories: political independence and economic independence. Political
independence is “the capacity to choose the final goal of monetary policy” while economic
independence is “the capacity to choose the instruments with which to pursue these goals” (1991;
366). To measure legal independence these authors rate each central bank on a scale ranging
from 0 to 8 for political independence and 1 to 8 for economic independence and then add up the
value of the two categories. Similar to the Cukierman measure, the higher the score the more
independent the central bank.
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT) examined central bank independence in only 18
industrial countries during the 1980s. The ability to use their data in large-scale cross-national
analysis, therefore, is severely limited. More recently, however, researchers (Arnon, Laurens,
Segalotto, and Sommer 2007) have expanded the GMT measure to include 68 countries during
the 1980s and 163 countries in the period ending in 2003. Additionally, to make comparisons to
Cukierman's (1992) measure of legal independence, they have also standardized the score for
both political independence and economic independence on a scale ranging from zero to one for
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each variable. This value is then divided by two to maintain the 0 to 1 scale.8 Since one of the
central goals of using two measures of legal independence is to increase internal validity of
thesis findings, I will use this standardized GMT scale in my analyses.
Table 4: GMT Measure of Legal Central Bank Independence
1980s
1990s
Political
Economic
Political
Independence
Independence
Independence
Mean
std.dev
Min
Max
N

Economic
Independence

0.44
0.23
0.00
1.00

0.30
0.19
0.00
0.88

0.49
0.30
0.00
1.00

0.68
0.18
0.25
1.00

68

68

157

157

Table 4 shows there was only a slight increase in political independence between the two
decades. Economic independence, on the other hand, changed drastically. Between the 1980s and
the 1990s it jumped more than 125 percent from .30 to .68. A potential reason for this change is
that governments may have recognized that with vast increases in international investment in
recent years, it is increasingly difficult for the central bank to maintain stable monetary policies.
It is, therefore, necessary to provide them with more policy instruments to achieve their goals.
This seems to verify previous research (e.g. Bernhard 2002; Cukierman 1995; Maxfield 1997)
showing a surge in legal central bank independence in the 1990s.
The de facto measure of central bank independence is measured based on the annual
number of changes in the central bank governor during the decade. Cukierman (1992) argues that
the higher the turnover rate, the lower the central bank’s autonomy. For example, if a country had
a single central bank governor for the entire decade, its de facto central bank autonomy score
8 Note: The questions used to determine political independence and economic independence, along with the
conversion scale for the standardization of these scores, is provided in Appendix 1.
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would be 0. In contrast, if the country changed central bank governors every year, its de facto
independence score would be 1.
Data for this variable came from two sources. The first source is Cukierman's (1992)
book covering 69 countries in both the developed and the developing world between 1960 and
1989. The second source, Sturm and de Haan (2001), covers 80 developing countries during two
time periods: the 1980s and the 1990s. It is important to note that although both datasets cover
the same concept, during the 1980s there are differences in their measures of the turnover rate for
the same country. Therefore, I will divide them into two separate variables. The first variable,
Turnover Rate, will utilize Cukierman’s data while the second variable, Turnover Rate 2, will use
Sturm and de Haan's data. An additional advantage of measuring the data separately is that it will
better indicate whether the hypotheses proposed in this thesis are valid across all countries or
only in developed or developing countries.
Table 5: Central Bank Governor’s Turnover Rate
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
Turnover Rate Turnover Rate Turnover Rate Turnover Rate 2 Turnover Rate 2
mean
std.dev
min
max
N

0.24
0.22
0.00
1.08

0.22
0.18
0.00
0.88

0.24
0.19
0.00
1.00

0.28
0.22
0.00
1.10

0.19
0.19
0.00
0.75

62

67

69

75

74

As indicated in Table 5, the average tenure of central bank governors ranged from a
minimum of 3.6 years in the 1980s, to a maximum of 5.2 years during the 1990s. This indicates a
trend toward greater de facto central bank independence in recent years. Another important
indicator is that the maximum turnover rate has declined from 1.10 in the 1980s to .75 in the
1990s showing a tenure increase for the least independent central bank governor from
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approximately 11 months to 16 months. Similar to the average turnover rate, this lower turnover
rate also indicates increasing de facto independence of central bank governors.
Since a higher turnover rate of the central bank governor indicates less independence
whereas a higher de jure score indicates more independence, I transformed both measurements of
legal central bank (GMT Legal and Cukierman Legal) by using the following equation: 1country score. Additionally, both variables measuring the turnover rate were rescaled by
dividing each country’s central bank governor’s turnover rate by the maximum turnover rate in
the dataset so that values range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. This was done so that I
could more accurately measure the divergence between de jure and de facto central bank. An
example may better illustrate the logic of this point. Country A provides the central bank with
perfect legal independence and as a result, its de jure independence score is 1. However, it
replaces the central bank governor every year. Therefore, its de facto score is also 1. If de jure
independence was subtracted from de facto independence it would indicate no difference
between the two measures when there were actually broad differences between them.
Divergence, the variable indicating the gap between the laws and practices, is defined as
the difference between legal central bank independence and the turnover rate of the central bank
governor. I calculated the divergence between the two types of central bank independence using
the following formulas: (Cukierman Legal-TOR) and (GMT Legal-TOR2). The variable
Divergence then indicates the difference between Turnover Rate and Cukierman Legal while the
variable Divergence 2 measures the difference between Turnover Rate 2 and GMT Legal.
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Table 6: Divergence Between de Jure and de Facto CBI
1960s
1970s
1980s
Divergence
Divergence
Divergence
mean
std.dev
min
max
N

Divergence 2

1990s
Divergence 2

.439
.202
-..225
.777

.455
.229
-.27
.86

.434
.209
-.309
.8

.398
.250
-.369
.829

.319
.253
-.622
.81

57

66

69

39

74

As indicated in Table 6, there are vast differences between legal obligations and actual
practices. Across all decades, the average divergence between de jure and de facto independence
ranges from a minimum of .319 in the 1990s to a maximum of .455 during the 1970s. This shows
that many governments are providing the central bank with a higher level of de facto than de jure
autonomy. It may also reflect the difficulty that governments face when trying to modify laws
providing the central bank with a level of autonomy.
Finally, the new measure of legal central bank independence is measured by interacting
each of the legal measures of independence, Cukierman Legal and GMT Legal, with the
variables measuring the divergence between actual practices and legal obligations. I defined the
variable this manner since the impact of each level of legal central bank independence is based
on how well the laws are actually followed. If there is absolute adherence to the laws governing
central bank independence (i.e. there is no difference between de jure and de facto
independence), then the impact of an independent central bank can be measured simply by using
the legal index of independence.
However, oftentimes central banks are given either greater or less de facto independence
than de jure independence. If the de facto measure of independence indicates greater
independence than is offered by the law, it is likely that this increased independence will enable
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the central bank to pursue stronger orthodox monetary policies. On the other hand, if the
turnover rate of the central bank governor indicates lower central bank independence then is
afforded by the law, a given level of legal independence will have a smaller impact on inflation
and inflation variability.
To measure democracy I use data from Freedom House and take a country’s average civil
rights and political liberties score across the decade. There are other well-respected measures of
democracy, including Polity IV and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (PACL).
However, the Freedom House measure is used since the hypothesis regarding the convergence
between de jure and de facto measures of central bank independence rests on the assumption that
democracy increases rule of law and stable property rights. Because Freedom House ratings
include political rights and civil liberties rather than political rights only, it is more appropriate
than either the Polity IV or the PACL measures that focus only on political rights.
Freedom House codes a country’s civil rights and political liberties on a scale from 1,
indicating the most democratic, to 7, which indicates the least democratic. It also provides three
categorical measures of democracy: free, partial free, and not free. However, I chose to use the
continuous measure to be able to identify the impact that more subtle changes in democracy have
on central bank independence. Measuring democracy as a continuous variable will also enable
me to examine the direct impact that changes in its level have on inflation and inflation
variability. This is important since some critics argue that authoritarian regimes are better able to
commit to orthodox monetary policies.
To create each country’s democracy score, researchers rate ten equally weighted political
rights questions and fifteen equally weighted civil liberties questions from sources that include
newspapers, think tanks, and visits to the regions, among others. Political rights are based on the
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electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government.
Meanwhile, civil liberties consist of freedom of expression and belief, associational and
organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, and individual rights. An important
limitation is that Freedom House did not begin its index of freedom until 1972. Therefore, I am
unable to measure the impact that democracy had on the convergence of measures of central
bank independence in the 1960s.
Table 7: Democracy
1970s
Political
Rights

Civil
Liberties

1980s
Political
Rights

Civil
Liberties

1990s
Political
Rights

Civil
Liberties

mean
std.dev
min
max

3.49
2.11
1.00
7.00

3.35
1.86
1.00
6.88

3.94
2.13
1.00
7.00

4.09
1.97
1.00
7.00

3.50
2.10
1.00
7.00

3.65
1.77
1.00
7.00

N

69

69

128

128

151

151

As indicated in Table 7, the average level of political rights and civil liberties remained
steady between the 1970s and 1990s. However, during the 1980s there was more than a half
point increase (i.e. a reduction) in both aspects of democracy. The blip in the data may be due in
part to an increase in the sample size that includes a larger number of developing countries. Apart
from this anomaly, it appears that across the three decades, most countries have civil rights and
political rights score that range from 1.5 to 6.0.
To code the electoral system variables, I use Matt Golder’s “Democratic Systems Around
the World, 1946-2000” (2004) dataset. This dataset contains information on 177 countries’
electoral systems between the year 1946, or the year of independence, and the year 2000. It is
important, however, to note that if a country is not democratic, the data are coded as missing.
More specifically, the following factors classify a regime as non-democratic: the chief executive
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is not elected, there is no more than one party, or there has been no alteration in power. Using
this criterion, out of 433 observations in the sample, 280, or approximately 65 percent, were
coded as missing.
Majoritarian, which indicates that the presence of a majoritarian electoral system, are all
countries that use plurality rule as well as those that use qualified voting majority. Mixed,
meanwhile, indicates a mixed electoral system where there is a mixture of majoritarian and
proportional rules. Finally, Proportional indicates the presence of a proportional representation
system that uses a proportional representation formula with a single electoral tier.
There, however, may be cases where electoral reforms caused a change in a country’s
type of electoral system. When this occurs, I look at the year when the change occurred. If it
occurred more than halfway through the decade, I code the country as having the previous
electoral system. On the other, if the change occurred before the halfway point of the decade I
code it as having the new electoral system. As indicated in Table 8, the sample uses a fairly even
distribution of countries using majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. However,
between the 1960s and the 1980s only Germany uses a mixed electoral system.
Table 8: Electoral System Type
1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

Majoritarian
Mixed
Proportional

11
1
16

10
1
11

17
1
20

24
15
26

N

28

22

38

65

From the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 dataset, I also use the 10
year averages of GDP and GDP per capita as control variables. These variables which are
designated GDP and GDP per Capita, respectively, are based on constant 2000 US Dollars.
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Studies (e.g. Diamond 1999; Barro 2000; Hadenius 2001) indicate that there is a high degree of
correlation between democracy and economic development. If there is a high GDP per capita,
there may be a larger group of individuals who are inflation averse. Likewise, the overall size of
the economy (i.e. its GDP) may influence the convergence of de jure and de facto central bank
independence since governments may have smaller revenue bases and capital markets. In
particular, this last factor has been identified by Cukierman (1995) as a key factor influencing
inflation. Therefore, using these variables will help ensure that the convergence between de jure
and de facto measures of central bank independence is due to democracy, as opposed to an
increase in economic development. Hence, my findings will have more internal validity.
Table 9: GDP9 and GDP per Capita
1960s
1970s
GDP
CAPITA
GDP

CAPITA

1980s
GDP

CAPITA

1990s
GDP

CAPITA

mean
std.dev
min
max
N

131
428
.17
3120

$5,138
$5,296
$86
$21,816

222
640
.62
4390

$7,066
$6,958
$132
$26,646

163
643
.11
5900

$5,880
$7,769
$99
$33,089

188
820
.04
8560

$6,082
$8,824
$95
$37,849

60

59

61

61

116

117

148

149

As indicated in Table 9, there is broad variation in the values for GDP and GDP per
capita. The difference between GDP per capita in all four decades is so great that the minimum
GDP per capita is less than one half of 1 percent of the maximum GDP per capita. In the 1980s,
for example, while the mean GDP per capita was approximately $5880, Ethiopia's GDP per
capita was a paltry $99, while the United Arab Emirates had the highest at $33,089. Likewise,
during the 1960s, the minimum GDP is .00005 percent of the maximum GDP. To prevent these

9

Note: GDP values in Table 6 are indicated in billions of Dollars.
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values from skewing my empirical findings, I utilize the natural log of both GDP and GDP per
capita.
The final control variable, Protest, is a measure of the average annual number of strikes,
riots, and anti-government demonstrations in each decade as indicated by Bank's (2006) database
“Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive”. Although not broadly studied in central bank
literature, some recent research (De Haan and Sierman 1996; Dreher, Sturm, and de Haan 2008)
has shown that increased political instability causes higher inflation. Rising political protest may
force the government to use monetary resources to reduce tensions which in turn provokes higher
inflation and inflation variability. This also has the potential to increase divergence between de
jure and de facto central bank independence as the government takes away power from the
central bank to pacify the public. It is, therefore, necessary to control for this variable in all
regression analyses in this thesis.
Table 10: Political Protest

mean
std.dev
min
max
N

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2.08
5.34
0.00
41.10

1.72
2.39
0.00
10.30

1.60
3.16
0.00
21.20

1.30
1.81
0.00
7.75

64

65

117

136

As indicated in Table 10, the average number of political protests declined continually
from the 1960s to the 1990s. Likewise, the maximum number of political protests declined more
than 80 percent from 41.10 annual incidents during the 1960s to 7.75 annual incidents during the
1990s. Additionally, while not linear, the standard deviation also declined during this same time
period. These data indicates an overall general decline in political protests in recent years.
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Given each of these variables, the general equations to test the four hypotheses posited in
this thesis are as follows:
Equation 1: Divergence=β0+Log_GDP+Log_GDP per Capita+Democracy+Mixed+
Proportional+Protest+ei
Equation 2: Log of Inflation= β0+ Legal Independence*Divergence+Legal Independence+
+Divergence +Log_GDP+Log_GDP per Capita+Democracy+Protest+ei
Equation 3: Inflation Variability= β0+ Legal Independence*Divergence+
Legal Independence +Divergence+Log_GDP+Log_GDP per Capita+Democracy+ ei
More specifically, Equation 1 states that the gap between de jure and de facto central
bank independence is a function of the log of GDP, the log of GDP per Capita, the level of
democracy, whether a country employs a mixed electoral system or a proportional electoral
system, and the level of political unrest. Meanwhile, Equation 2 indicates that the inflation rate is
a product of the new measure of legal independence, which is a function of legal independence
and the divergence between de jure and de facto independence, the log of GDP, the log of GDP
per Capita, and the level of democracy and political protest. Finally, Equation 3 indicates that
inflation variability is conditioned upon the new measure of legal independence, which is a
function of legal independence and the divergence between de jure and de facto independence,
the log of GDP, the log of GDP per Capita, and the level of democracy and political protest.
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Chapter 6
Results
I first tested the impact that democracy and proportional electoral systems have on the
divergence between de jure and de facto central bank independence. There was, however, a high
level of collinearity (close to .7) between GDP per Capita and Democracy. To deal with this
problem, I ran three models for the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s.10 The first model includes both
GDP per Capita and Democracy, the second model includes GDP per Capita but not
Democracy, and the third model includes Democracy but not GDP per Capita.

10

This was not done for the 1960s since the Freedom House measure of democracy was unavailable for those years.
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Table 11: Divergence Between Cukierman Legal CBI and the Central Bank Governor’s
Turnover Rate in Developed and Developing Countries, 1960s-1980s
1960s
1970s
1980s
model 1
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 1 model 2 model 3

Democracy

-------

.011
(-.2)

-.018
(-.37)

-------

-.011
(-.26)

-.034*
(-1.48)

-------

GDP

.052*
(-1.64)

.015
(-.33)

.048
(-1.19)

.015
(-.33)

-.028
(-.95)

-.019
(-.75)

-.03
(-1.07)

GDP per Capita

.047
(-1.17)

.102*
(-1.34)

-------

.095*
(-1.41)

.043
(-.6)

-------

.059*
(-1.59)

-------

-.313
(-1.13)

-.396*
(-1.44)

-.312
(-1.15)

-.257
(-1.09)

-.243
(-1.05)

-.265
(-1.15)

Proportional

-.033
(-.38)

.035
(-.31)

.033
(-.28)

.039
(-.36)

-.137*
(-1.67)

-.127*
(-1.6)

-.142**
(-1.8)

Protest

-.007
(-1.18)

.001
(-.03)

-.022
(-.85)

.002
(-.07)

.004
(-.29)

-.001
(-.06)

.005
(-.42)

-1.215**
(-1.74)

-.914
(-.86)

-.684
(-.64)

-.823
(-.88)

.849
-1.08

1.086*
(-1.62)

.72
(-1.21)

Mixed

Constant

Adjusted R2
.18
-.02
-.06
.03
.02
.04
N
30
26
26
26
35
35
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: Higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
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.05
35

Table 12: Divergence Between GMT Legal CBI and the Central Bank
Governor’s Turnover Rate in Developing Countries, 1980s-1990s
1980s
model 1

model 3

1990s
model 1

model 2

model 2

model 3

Democracy

-.043
(-.48)

-------

.021
(-.49)

.016
(-.4)

-------

.005
(-.19)

GDP

.054
(-.51)

.018
(-.25)

-.023
(-.42)

-.065*
(-1.48)

-.059*
(-1.46)

-.055*
(-1.6)

GDP per Capita

-.185
(-.83)

-.091
(-.88)

-------

.03
(-.38)

.007
(-.13)

-------

-------

-------

-------

-.024
(-.13)

-.01
(-.06)

-.009
(-.05)

Proportional

-.312*
(-1.82)

-.321**
(-1.99)

-.336**
(-2.03)

-.063
(-.55)

-.063
(-.56)

-.062
(-.55)

Protest

-.032
(-.96)

-.02
(-.98)

-.008
(-.5)

.04
(-1.3)

.037
(-1.27)

.034
(-1.29)

Constant

.735
(-.52)

.672
(-.51)

.86
(-.63)

1.359*
(-1.6)

1.487**
(-1.93)

1.421**
(-1.74)

R2

.07

.17

.11

-.05

-.02

-.02

N

12

12

12

31

31

31

Mixed

*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: Higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy

A central contention of this thesis is that an increase in the level of democracy reduces
the gap between legal central bank independence and the central bank’s governor’s turnover rate.
This, in turn, is important because it reduces uncertainty regarding the central bank’s ability to
pursue orthodox monetary policies over the long term. However, as indicated in Table 11, the
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level of democracy had no impact on the divergence between legal central bank independence
and the central bank governor’s turnover rate in the 1960s and the 1970s using the Cukierman
legal independence measure with a sample of developed and developing countries. Likewise,
Table 12 shows that democracy was had no effect on the gap between the GMT measure of legal
independence and the turnover rate of the central bank governor using a sample of developing
countries during the 1980s and 1990s.
The only time that democracy had a statistically significant impact on the gap between
the two types of central bank independence was in model 2, which did not include GDP per
capita as a control variable, using the Cukierman legal independence measure in the 1980s.
Contrary to my hypothesis, however, a decline in democracy actually reduced the divergence
between legal central bank independence and the central bank governor’s turnover rate in this
decade.11 A potential reason for this finding is that in democratic countries, as the level of
democracy increases, politicians feel stronger pressure from their constituents regarding
monetary policy. This pressure may cause them to reduce or increase de facto central bank
independence in response to the pressures that are placed on them by the general public, thus
increasing divergence between de jure and de facto central bank independence. In any event,
evidence does not support my argument that an increase in the level of democracy reduces the
gap between de jure and de facto central bank independence. It is, therefore, necessary to reject
the hypothesis that a higher level of democracy in a state will reduce the gap between de jure and
de facto central bank independence.

11

As mentioned in the research design, the Freedom House measure of democracy, which I use in this thesis, ranks
the most democratic countries with a lower score.
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I also argued that the greater number of political parties present in countries using
proportional electoral systems, in comparison to countries using majoritarian electoral systems,
increases the need for credible information on monetary policies that the central bank provides.
Consequently, I hypothesized that in democracies, countries utilizing proportional electoral
systems will have a smaller gap between de jure and de facto central bank independence than
countries utilizing majoritarian electoral systems. The empirical evidence for this hypothesis is
mixed.
As Table 11 and Table 12 indicate, proportional electoral systems had no impact on the
divergence between de jure and de facto central bank independence in the 1960s, the 1970s, and
the 1990s. However, in agreement with my hypothesis, using both the Cukierman and the GMT
legal independence measures, proportional electoral systems reduced the gap between the two
types of central bank independence in the 1980s. It is interesting to note that democracy and
proportional electoral systems are only important in the 1980s. This may indicate that there are
unique decade factors, such as the debt crisis in Latin America, influencing the convergence of
de jure and de facto central bank independence.
Among the control variables, the level of political protest had no impact on the gap
between legal independence and the turnover rate of the central bank governor. The presence of a
mixed electoral system, however, reduced the gap between the two measures by almost .4 points
in the 1970s, but since only one country in the sample, Germany, had a mixed electoral system,
the practical importance of this finding is very minimal. Meanwhile, the log of GDP was
statistically significant in the 1960s for the Cukierman model and in the 1990s for the GMT
model. Its impact, however, is difficult to assess since it increased the gap between legal
independence and the turnover rate the 1960s but reduced it during the1990s.
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Finally, in the Cukierman model, GDP per capita led to greater divergence in the 1970s
and the 1980s. Since the model only looks at the divergence between the two types of central
bank independence and not whether it is positive or negative (i.e. whether the central bank is
given greater or less de facto independence), it is impossible to determine whether the populous
is making demands that the central bank be afforded more or less independence. However, I
speculate that as GDP per capita increases, the middle and upper social classes desire greater
central bank independence to protect their income, thus leading to greater de facto independence.
Table 13 and Table 14 then analyze the impact that legal central bank independence and
the central bank governor’s turnover rate have on the log of inflation.12 In general, it is believed
that a central bank that has more legal independence and a lower turnover rate will have lower
inflation. A central contention of this thesis, however, is that my new measure of legal
independence, which takes into account legal independence and the gap between it and de facto
independence, will lead to a better prediction of inflation than indices using individual de jure or
de facto measures of central bank independence. Testing the impact that individual measures of
de jure and de facto central bank independence have on inflation will better indicate the
comparative benefits of using the new model of legal independence.
In Table 13 and Table 14, model 1 indicates that the turnover rate of the central bank
governor was a key indicator of the log of inflation in the 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s in
both developed and developing countries. As expected, an increase in the turnover rate led to
higher inflation. For example, in contrast to a country that has no turnover in the central bank
governor during the decade, a country that changes its governor every year during a decade
would have a log of inflation value that was between 1.56 and 3.47 points higher.
12

Note: I used robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity problems.
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Meanwhile, for these same three decades, both measures of legal central bank
independence, Cukierman Legal and GMT Legal, did not impact the log of inflation. However,
this changed in the 1990s when the central bank governor’s turnover rate was insignificant while
GMT legal independence was statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, a reduction in
legal independence actually reduced the log of inflation in this decade.13 A potential reason for
this finding is that developing countries may have viewed legal central bank independence as an
institutional device to combat excessively high inflation. Therefore, they increased legal central
bank independence in this decade. However, beneath the surface, they were experiencing strong
pressures to follow inflationary policies due to factors such as high unemployment and low
government revenues, thus undermining the effectiveness of legal independence.
In model 2, I ran a regression with the same variables from model 1 but also interacted
the variables measuring legal independence, Cukierman Legal and GMT Legal, with the turnover
rate of the central bank governors. This shows whether the effect of legal independence is
contingent upon de facto independence. Graph 1 indicates that Cukierman legal central bank
independence in the 1960s is significant when the turnover rate is less than .02 or greater than
0.2. When the turnover rate is below .02, legal central bank leads to a reduction in the log of
inflation although its impact declines as the turnover rate increases from zero. In contrast, as the
governor’s turnover rate increases above .2, legal independence leads to a higher log of inflation.
This seems to indicate that the benefits of legal independence are strongly conditioned upon the
turnover rate in this decade.

13

As indicated in the research design, both measures of legal independence were transformed so that a lower score
indicates more independence.
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Graph 2 then shows that during the 1970s, legal independence is significant only when
the turnover rate is below .04. Similar to the 1960s, in this small area, legal central bank
independence leads to a reduction in the log of inflation although its impact declines as the
turnover rate increases. It is also important to note that only 12 out of 53 countries in the sample
had a turnover rate below .04. The practical importance of legal independence in this decade,
therefore, is muted.
In the 1980s, Cukierman legal independence had no impact on the log of inflation. Graph
3 and Graph 4, however, show that the GMT legal central bank independence measure was
significant in the 1980s and 1990s using a sample of developing countries when the turnover rate
was greater than approximately 0.35 in the 1980s and .1 in the 1990s. Contrary to expectations,
an increase in the turnover rate above these thresholds actually increased the effectiveness of
legal central bank independence in reducing the log of inflation. Moreover, in both decades,
more than 60 percent of countries had a turnover rate in the range of statistical significance,
indicating that this finding can be applied to a large number of developing countries.
Finally, among the control variables, Protest was significant in the 1960s. Its impact,
however, was opposite from what I predicted with each additional protest action in the 1960s
leading to a .026 point reduction in the log of inflation. Meanwhile, both Democracy and GDP
per Capita were significant in the 1970s and the 1990s. In the 1970s, both a decline in the level
of democracy and an increase in the log of GDP per capita led to a higher log of inflation while
during the 1990s a decrease in democracy and an increase in the log of GDP per capita caused a
decline in the log of inflation. This is particularly interesting since the impact that these two
variables have on inflation moves in opposite directions from one decade to the next.
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Table 13: Effect of Cukierman Legal Central Bank Independence and
the CB Governor’s Turnover Rate on the Log of Inflation
1960s
1970s
1980s
model 1
model 2
model 1 model 2
model 1

model 2

Cukierman Legal

.755
(1.01)

-1.353*
(-1.53)

-.363
(-.59)

-1.323*
(-1.37)

-.822
(-.73)

.191
(-.1)

Turnover Rate

1.809*
(1.58)

-5.454**
(-2.01)

1.56**
(2.24)

-2.052
(-0.59)

3.355***
(3.51)

5.403
(.79)

Cukierman Legal
*Turnover Rate

-------

10.615***
(2.49)

-------

6.026
(1.1)

-------

-3.188
(-.29)

Democracy

-------

-------

.092**
(1.94)

.096**
(2.06)

-.054
(-.71)

-.054
(-.71)

GDP

.153
(.96)

.161
(.99)

-.078
(-.84)

-.084
(-.9)

-.096
(-.79)

-.089
(-.72)

GDP per Capita

-.097
(-.5)

-.119
(-.62)

.192*
(1.67)

.212**
(1.86)

-.203
(-1.03)

-.205
(-1.04)

Protest

-.026**
(-1.68)

-.032**
(-1.93)

.048
(1.15)

.041
(.93)

-.014
(-.34)

-.014
(-.36)

Constant

-6.915**
(-2.7)

-5.53**
(-2.1)

-2.502
(-1.14)

-1.931
(-.87)

2.196
(.79)

1.639
(.54)

R2
.15
.20
.33
.35
.31
N
44
44
53
53
57
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher Legal score indicates less legal independence
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Table 14: Effect of GMT Legal Central Bank Independence and the CB Governor’s
Turnover Rate on the Log of Inflation in Developing Countries
Countries
1980s
1990s
model 1
model 2
model 1
model 2
GMT Legal

-1.367
(-1.03)

.427
(.17)

-1.783**
(-1.86)

-1.262
(-.89)

3.477***
(3.27)

7.184*
(1.61)

.593
(.79)

1.487
(.77)

GMT Legal*Turnover Rate 2

-------

-5.163
(-.86)

-------

-2.082
(-.5)

Democracy

.01
(.11)

.0003
(0)

-.089*
(-1.6)

-.094**
(-1.65)

GDP

-.039
(-.22)

-.003
(-.01)

.061
(.57)

.072
(.65)

GDP per Capita

.071
(.32)

.016
(.07)

-.403***
(-3.15)

-.412**
(-3.17)

Protest

-.039
(-.84)

-.05
(-1.04)

-.038
(-.46)

-.049
(-.57)

Constant

-1.147
(-.3)

-2.77
(-.64)

.88
(.4)

.523
(.22)

Turnover Rate 2

.23
.22
.20
.19
R2
N
32
32
59
59
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher GMT score indicates less legal independence
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The final inflation model uses the new measure of legal central bank independence that I
propose in this thesis. It was created by interacting each measure of legal central bank
independence, Cukierman Legal and GMT Legal, with divergence from de facto central bank
independence, which is measured by the turnover rate of the central bank governor. The central
premise behind using this new measure is that it will provide a better indicator of a central bank’s
ability to pursue orthodox monetary policies over the long term than either de jure or de facto
measures by themselves.
Graphs 5 to 7 indicate that Cukierman Legal is significant in all three decades when the
variable Divergence is below .55. In the sample, 67 percent, 60 percent, and 70 percent of
countries had Divergence values that were within this threshold during the 1960s, the 1970s, and
the 1980s, respectively. This implies that the new model of legal independence has broad
application for explaining the log value of inflation.
Since Divergence was created using the formula (Cukierman Legal-Turnover Rate), the
graphs also demonstrate that when the central bank has more de facto independence (i.e. a lower
turnover rate) than de jure (i.e. legal) independence, the country will experience a lower log
inflation value than it would if the value of the turnover rate was exactly the same or higher than
the legal independence score. This finding challenges the commonly accepted belief in central
bank literature that the central bank governor’s turnover rate has no impact on inflation in
developed countries. It is also interesting to note that within the area of statistical significance,
the regression line is always positive which indicates that regardless of the level of legal central
bank independence, there will always be inflation.
I then tested the impact that the new GMT legal model had on the log of inflation and
found that it was not significant during the 1990s. In contrast, as shown in Graph 8, during the
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1980s the GMT measure of legal central bank independence is statistically significant when
divergence is above .22. More specifically, the model indicates that when the central bank is
given more de facto independence than de jure independence, there will be a higher log inflation
value. I speculate that the contradictory evidence between the analyses done using the
Cukierman legal independence measure and the GMT legal independence measure in the 1980s
may be due to differences in the samples used. Whereas, the Cukierman legal model includes
both developed and developing countries, the GMT legal model includes only developing
countries that are already prone to higher levels of inflation.
These findings have two important implications. First, in agreement with my
expectations, the new measure of legal central bank independence, which takes into account
legal independence and the gap between laws and practices, is an important indicator of a central
bank’s ability to pursue low inflationary policies in every decade except for the 1990s. Its
impact, however, is contingent upon the case selection and the measure of legal central bank
independence used. More specifically, it appears that the impact of legal independence differs
between a sample composed of developed and developing countries versus a sample of only
developing countries. It may be necessary, therefore, to design models of central bank
independence that focus exclusively on either developed or developing countries. Second, the
lack of continuity between the two measures of legal independence once again shows the need
for a more concrete definition of legal central bank independence. This, however, is a task that
must be completed at another time.
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Table 15: Effect of Cukierman Legal Central Bank Independence on the Log of
Inflation in Developed and Developing Countries as Divergences Increases,
1960s-1980s
1960s
1970s
1980s
Cukierman Legal*Divergence

-9.151**
(-2.32)

-7.705**
(-2.46)

-6.062
(-.9)

Cukierman Legal

6.553**
(2.79)

5.448**
(2.86)

5.126*
(1.38)

Divergence

4.359*
(1.68)

3.072*
(1.53)

.586
(.14)

Democracy

-------

.097**
(2.13)

-.053
(-.67)

GDP

.17
(1.09)

-.086
(-.99)

-.101
(-.83)

GDP per Capita

-.099
(-.53)

.237**
(2.09)

-.191
(-.95)

-.033**
(-2.04)

.044
(1.09)

-.015
(-.38)

-9.866***
(-3.67)

-5.136**
(-2.26)

.631
(.19)

Protest

Constant

.22
.39
.32
R2
N
44
53
57
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher Legal score indicates less legal independence
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Table 16: Effect of GMT Legal Central Bank Independence on the Log of Inflation in
Developing Countries as Divergences Increases, 1980s-1990s
1980s
1990s

GMT Legal*Divergence 2

4.102
(.83)

1.702
(.66)

GMT Legal

1.188
(.59)

-1.619
(-1.14)

-6.277**
(-1.77)

-1.268
(-1)

Democracy

.017
(.18)

-.096**
(-1.68)

GDP

.003
(.15)

.078
(.7)

GDP per Capita

-.005
(-.02)

-.423***
(-3.2)

Protest

-.054
(-1.08)

-.058
(-.66)

Constant

-1.722
(-.44)

.846
(.38)

Divergence 2

R2
.22
.19
N
32
59
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher GMT score indicates less legal independence
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I then changed the dependent variable to Inflation Variability and reran the regression
models. Similar to inflation, it is believed that when a central bank that has more legal
independence and a lower turnover rate, a country will experience less inflation variability.
Likewise, I hypothesize that my new measure of legal independence, which takes into account
legal independence and the gap between it and de facto independence, will lead to a better
prediction of inflation variability than indices using individual de jure or de facto measures of
central bank independence.
Table 17 shows that using Cukierman’s measure, legal central bank independence by
itself had no impact on inflation variability in any decade, while an increase in the central bank
governor’s turnover rate actually reduced inflation variability in the 1980s. In contrast, as shown
in Table 18, the GMT measure of legal central bank independence was statistically significant in
both the 1980s and the 1990s, while the turnover rate was significant in the 1980s. In line with
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my expectations, Table 18 shows that a decline in legal central bank independence causes an
increase in inflation variability in both decades. It is also interesting to note that the marginal
effect of GMT legal independence increased by more than 35 percent in the 1990s. This may
indicate that developing countries are recognizing that legal central bank independence is only
beneficial when laws are actually followed. They are, therefore, interfering less in the central
bank’s operations.
Contrary to expectations, an increase in the central bank governor’s turnover rate in the
1980s, led to lower inflation variability. Since evidence from both developed and developing
countries (i.e. the sample for the Cukierman and the GMT legal models) indicates that an
increase in the governor’s turnover rate leads to higher inflation variability, this appears to be an
excellent indicator of inflation variability in this decade. Once again, this points to the idea that
the effect of central bank independence in the 1980s is unique from other decades. However, it is
also important to remember that inflation variability is measured based on average number of
standard deviations that each decade’s inflation rate is from the mean decade inflation rate.
Therefore, while a higher turnover rate may provide lower inflation variability, the country may
still experience high overall levels of inflation.
In model 2, I then interacted Cukierman Legal and Turnover Rate and found that
Cukierman’s measure of legal independence was statistically insignificant in the 1960s and the
1980s. However, Graph 9 shows that when the turnover rate is below .1 in the 1970s, legal
central bank independence reduces inflation variability. However, its effect declines as the
turnover rate approaches .1. Since a mere 18 percent of countries have a turnover rate below .1,
this model has minimal applicability.
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The results, however, become more uncertain when using the interactive model
containing GMT Legal and Turnover Rate 2. Graph 10, which examines the 1980s, shows that
the GMT measure of legal central bank independence is significant when the turnover rate is
above .23, which is an area that includes 30 percent of countries in the sample. It also indicates
that as the turnover rate increases, legal central bank independence leads to higher inflation
variability. However, in Graph 11, which uses this same interactive model in the 1990s, legal
central bank independence is also statistically significant when the turnover rate is below .42, but
as the turnover rate increases, legal central bank independence leads to lower inflation
variability.
Finally, among control variables, the level of political protest and democracy were
insignificant across all decades and models. Meanwhile, in the model using Cukierman’s
measure of legal independence, a higher GDP per capita increased inflation variability in the
1980s, while GDP increased it in the GMT model. Once again, this seems to indicate that the size
of the economy is an important factor influencing the central bank’s ability to pursue orthodox
monetary policies. However, the importance of these variables one again depends on the model
used and the decade examined.
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Table 17: Effect of Cukierman Legal Central Bank Independence and the CB Governor’s
Turnover Rate on Inflation Variability
1960s
1970s
1980s
model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2
Cukierman Legal
*Turnover Rate

-------

.009
(.33)

-------

.723
(1.13)

-------

.322
(.44)

Cukierman Legal

-.047
(-.67)

-.065
(-.73)

-.092
(-1.06)

-.207*
(-1.44)

.086
(.92)

.022
(.15)

Turnover Rate

-.013
(-.36)

-.074
(-.39)

-.05
(-.91)

-.484
(-1.25)

-.263***
(-4.22)

-.471
(-.96)

-------

-------

-.002
(-.39)

-.001
(-.3)

.001
(.28)

.001
(.28)

GDP

-.001
(-.12)

.001
(-.12)

-.004
(-.45)

-.005
(-.51)

-.003
(-.4)

-.003
(-.51)

GDP per Capita

.008
(.54)

.008
(.52)

.011
(.9)

.013
(1.14)

.018*
(1.56)

.018*
(1.57)

Protest

.001
(.82)

.001
(.77)

.003
(.6)

.002
(.43)

.001
(.43)

.001
(.46)

.78***
(4.65)

.792***
(4.64)

.865***
(3.69)

.933***
(3.51)

.657***
(3.44)

.713***
(3.25)

Democracy

Constant

R2
.06
.06
.12
.14
.32
.32
N
44
44
53
53
57
57
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher Legal score indicates less legal independence
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Table 18: Effect of GMT Legal Central Bank Independence and the CB Governor’s
Turnover Rate on Inflation Variability
1980s
1990s
model 1
model 2
model 1
model 2
-------

.577*
(-1.47)

-------

-.337
(-.68)

.18**
(1.86)

-.021
(-.14)

.25**
(1.94)

.334*
(-1.5)

-.311***
(-5.71)

.725**
(-2.45)

.003
(.03)

.148
-0.57

Democracy

-.002
(-.38)

-.001
(-.18)

-.002
(-.41)

-.003
(-.53)

GDP

.009
(.89)

.005
(-.5)

.017*
(1.37)

.019*
(1.46)

GDP per Capita

-.007

-.001

-.012

-.014

(-.55)

(-.08)

(-.89)

(-.98)

Protest

.001
(.32)

.002
(-.83)

-.013
(-1.12)

-.015
(-1.22)

Constant

.52**

.701***

.342*

.284

(2.05)

(-2.65)

(1.36)

(-1)

GMT Legal*Turnover Rate 2

GMT Legal

Turnover Rate 2

R2
.47
.51
.10
N
32
32
59
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher GMT score indicates less legal independence
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I then ran regressions to gauge the impact that my new legal central bank independence
measure, which was made by interacting legal independence with the divergence between it and
the central bank governor’s turnover, had on inflation variability. As indicated in Graph 12 and
Graph 13, this new measure had no impact on inflation variability in the 1960s and the 1970s.
Meanwhile, Graph 14 shows that new Cukierman legal central bank independence measure is a
statistically significant indicator of inflation variability in the 1980s when Divergence is above
.27 and below .6; this is a category in which more than 59 percent of countries are located.
However, the slope in this area changes less than .05 standard deviations, which shows that while
Cukierman legal central bank independence reduces inflation variability in this decade, changes
in Divergence have minimal impact on its importance.
Meanwhile, Graphs 15 and 16 show that GMT legal central bank independence had a
statistically significant in the 1980s when Divergence was above .22, and in the 1990s when it
was above .18. In both decades, this accounts for more than 75 percent of the cases. This,
however, is where the similarity ends. In the 1980s, legal central bank independence caused a
decline in inflation variability and as divergence increased, it declined more sharply. Overall, this
shows that when a country has a higher level of de facto central bank independence, legal
independence will have a stronger effect in reducing inflation variability. In contrast, during the
1990s, at a given level of legal independence, an increase in divergence led to higher inflation
variability. This indicates that providing the central bank with greater de facto independence in
this decade led to lower price stability.
Together these results show the new Cukierman and GMT measures of legal central bank
independence reduced inflation variability in the 1980s, while in the 1990s, the GMT measure
increased it. Meanwhile, during the 1960s and the 1970s, Cukierman legal independence had no
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impact on inflation variability. So what explains these divergent findings? For the inability of
central bank independence to influence inflation variability during the 1960s and 1970s, a
possible explanation is the lack of sample variance which makes it difficult to find statistical
significance. For the 1960s and the 1970s, respectively, 95 percent of the cases had an inflation
variability rate that fell between .65 and .92, and .65 and .9 standard deviations. This problem
may have been exacerbated by measuring inflation variability based on the number of standard
deviations from the mean inflation. Although this is a commonly used measure, extremely outlier
values have the potential of creating a standard deviation that is larger than what we would
expect for most values in the decade.
In regards to the 1990s, evidence showing that as divergence increased, legal central bank
independence led to higher inflation variability may be either a decade or sample specific
finding. For example, in developing countries where oftentimes there is greater income
inequality, it may be more difficult for the government to justify providing the central bank with
broad legal independence. Therefore, the government may provide it with more de facto
independence to pursue low inflation variability. However, as indicated in the example of Brazil
that was provided in Chapter 1, this may reduce investor confidence and cause large swings in
monetary policy that increase inflation variability. In the future, it would be interesting to test
this idea by expand the Cukierman legal independence measure to include the 1990s so that a
comparative analysis could be made between samples of developed and developing countries,
and between the two measures of legal independence.
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Table 19: Effect of Cukierman Legal Central Bank Independence on Inflation Variability
in Developed and Developing Countries as Divergence Increases, 1960s-1980s
1960s
1970s
1980s
Cukierman Legal
*Divergence

-4.5
(-.15)

16.5
(.78)

-2
(-.04)

Cukierman Legal

-.041
(-.31)

-.037
(-.14)

-.169
(-.77)

Divergence

.043
(.21)

.165
(.78)

.276
(.86)

Democracy

-------

-.002
(-.36)

.001
(.28)

GDP

-.001
(-.11)

-.004
(-.47)

-.003
(-.41)

GDP per Capita

.008
(.53)

.012
(1)

.018*
(1.58)

Protest

.001
(.76)

.003
(.57)

.001
(.42)

Constant

.766***
(3.89)

.799*** .652**
(3.3)
(2.95)

R2
.06
.12
.32
N
44
53
57
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher Legal score indicates less legal independence
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Table 20: Effect of GMT Legal Central Bank Independence on Inflation Variability
in Developing Countries as Divergence Increases, 1980s-1990s
1980s
1990s
model 1
model 1
GMT Legal*Divergence 2

-.30
(-1.05)

.263
(1.08)

GMT Legal

-.064
(-.59)

.187
(1.1)

Divergence 2

.516**
(2.46)

-.107
(-.77)

Democracy

-.002
(-.48)

-.003
(-.57)

GDP

.004
(.33)

.02*
(1.51)

GDP per Capita

-.002
(-.12)

-.015
(-1.07)

Protest

.002
(.77)

-.016
(-1.24)

.562**

.336*

(2.14)

(1.34)

.49

59

Constant

R2

N
32
.11
*=p≤.1 **=p≤.05 ***=p≤.001 1-tailed t-test (t-scores are indicated below coefficient)
Note: A higher Democracy score indicates a lower level of democracy
Note: A higher GMT score indicates less legal independence
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis began with a simple question: What impact does an independent central bank
have on monetary policy? After explaining the inadequacies of current measures of central bank
independence, I proposed a new measure of legal independence. This was created by interacting
existing measures of legal independence with the gap between them and de facto central bank
independence, which is based on the turnover rate of the central bank governor. Then I examined
domestic political factors influencing the level of divergence to better indicate the interaction
between monetary policy and politics.
Contrary to expectations, a decline in the level of democracy reduced the gap between de
jure and de facto central bank independence in the 1980s. I speculate that this may have occurred
since an increase in the level of democracy enables citizens to apply greater pressure to
politicians with regards to monetary policy. Therefore, politicians, who are rational actors, will
seek to satisfy their constituents so that they remain in power. Meanwhile, in agreement with my
argument, the presence of a proportional electoral system reduced divergence, but only in the
1980s.
I then tested this new measure of legal central bank independence and found that it had
broad predictive power in explaining inflation. Its effect, however, varies depending on the
decade examined, the measure of legal independence used, and the level of divergence between
de jure and de facto central bank independence. Even so, this is an important finding that
contradicts commonly-accepted scholarly research (e.g. Cukierman 1992) which argues that
legal central bank independence does not matter in developing countries. In more practical terms,
it indicates to politicians in all types of countries that it is worth expending the necessary
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political capital to provide the central bank with more legal independence since this can help
reduce inflation over the long term.
Meanwhile, the new legal independence measure was able to explain inflation variability
in developed and developing countries in the 1980s and the 1990s but not during the 1960s and
the 1970s. In what appears to be contrary evidence, it reduced inflation variability in the 1980s,
but increased it in the 1990s. I hypothesize that the lack of evidence in the earlier two decades
and the contradictory evidence between the 1980s and the 1990s may be due to the lack of
variance in inflation variability. As shown in Chapter 6, inflation variability tends to cluster in
the .6 to .9 standard deviations range which makes it difficult to detect the impact that legal
central bank independence has on this variable.
Another possible reason for the lack of evidence in regards to inflation variability is that
inflation and inflation variability may be affected by different factors. This would not be
surprising since several studies (e.g. Bade and Park 1988; De Haan and Eijffinger 1994) have
shown that while legal independence reduces inflation, it has either no effect or a mixed effect on
inflation variability. If this is case, however, then the situation becomes even more complicated
for countries that are trying to achieve low inflation and inflation variability. Additionally,
scholars must develop separate models that show which aspects of legal central bank
independence are most important for reducing inflation variability.
It is also important to note that across all models and decades examined in this thesis,
during the 1980s, many variables that were insignificant in other decades became statistically
significant. Additionally, the impact of the new legal central bank independence measure seemed
to change. This may point to unique decade factors, such as the debt crisis in Latin America, that
are influencing a country’s ability to pursue price stability. Future research may want to
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reanalyze the data using a panel research design that controls for the effects of the 1980s. This
will better indicate the impact that the new measure of legal central bank independence has
across a broader swath of time.
In closing, an independent central bank will not solve all of a country’s price stability
issues. Oftentimes, these problems have deep historical roots that require many years to correct.
It does appear, however, that legal central bank independence can have at least a moderate effect
in helping countries achieve price stability. It should be used, therefore, as a tool to help provide
countries with long term economic health. However, given the broad impact of the current
economic crisis on both developed and developing countries, it would not be surprising to see a
general decline in central bank independence as politicians try to reduce unemployment by
expanding the monetary supply.
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Appendix 1
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (GMT) Measure of Legal CB Independence
Political Independence
1. Central bank governor appointed without government involvement
2. Central bank governor is appointed for more than five years
3. Central bank board appointed without government involvement
4. Central bank board appointed for more than five years
5. No mandatory participation of government representatives in the central bank board
6. No government approval is required for formulation of monetary policymakers
7. central bank is legally obliged to pursue stability as one of its primary objectives
8. There are legal protections that strengthen the central bank's position in the event of a
conflict with the government
Economic Independence
1. No automatic procedure for the government to obtain direct credit from the central bank
2. When available, credit is extended to the government at market interest rates
3. When available, credit is temporary
4. When available, credit is for a limited amount
5. The central bank does not participate in the primary market for public debt
6. The central bank is responsible for setting policy rate
7. The central bank has no responsibility to oversee banking sector (two points) or shares
responsibility with other institutions (one point)
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